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INSURANCE LAW AND ASBESTOSIS-WHEN IS COVERAGE OF A PRO-
GRESSIVE DISEASE TRIGGERED?-Keene Corporation v. Insurance
Company of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
More than fifteen thousand people' alleging asbestos-related injuries2
have filed suit against manufacturers of asbestos products. Most of the
plaintiffs are workers who came into contact with asbestos products in
their workplaces: installers of insulation in buildings, workers in ship-
yards, and others employed by the purchasers of asbestos products.3 As-
bestosis typically develops slowly, with an extremely long delay between
first exposure and diagnosis.4 Asbestos manufacturers often had several
liability insurers during those years. 5
At least twenty suits have been filed to resolve the issue of insurance
coverage, 6 and both the courts and the insurance carriers are divided on
1. When Manville Corporation (Johns-Manville until 1982) filed for Chapter 11 reorganization
on August 26, 1982, 11,000 suits, representing 15,550 plaintiffs, had been filed against it. New suits
were being filed at the rate of 425 a month, representing 495 new plaintiffs. Manville's consultant
estimated that ultimately 52,000 suits would be filed, representing $2 billion in claims. Suits are
being filed against more than 400 defendants. Manville is named as a defendant in nearly all the suits,
so these figures approximate the total number of suits. Telephone interview with William Keough,
Associate Editor of the ASBESTOS LITIGATON REP. (NAT'L. L. REP.) (Sept. 3, 1982) (notes of the
interview on file with Washington Law Review); see also Commercial Union Insurance Companies,
Environmental Issues Task Force, Asbestos-A Social Problem, 1-2 (Position Paper, May 12, 198 1)
[hereinafter cited as Task Force]; Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15
FORUM 860, 865 (1980). Six thousand suits had been filed against Keene at the time it filed suit
against its primary insurers. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102S. Ct. 1644(1982).
2. The injury alleged in these cases takes the form of asbestosis, mesothelioma, or lung cancer.
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1644 (1982). See generally Mansfield, supra note 1, at 862-64 (describing diseases). Expo-
sure to asbestos also increases the risk of several other cancers. See generally Health Hazards of
Asbestos Exposure, 330 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCi. (1979) (report of an international con-
ference in June 1978).
3. It is projected that as many as 5.6 million Americans may die from diseases caused by work-
place exposure since World War II. See Task Force, supra note 1, at 13. Many of the plaintiffs in the
suits were not employees of the asbestos manufacturers. They sued the manufacturers because, under
workers' compensation laws, they could not sue their employers. Employees of manufacturers, as
well as other workers who sue their employers, can recover only if they prove intentional misconduct
not covered under the workers' compensation laws of their state. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980)
(manufacturer is not liable for employee's initial injuries, but is liable for fraudulent concealment of
his condition, which aggravated his disease).
4. See infra part 1A.
5. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1233
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (manufacturer had had five insurers since 1955), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
6. Task Force, supra note 1, at 43 & app. C. See also infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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which insurer bears the risk of loss. Two courts have held that exposure to
asbestos during a policy period triggers coverage, so that the insurers dur-
ing all the years of exposure may be liable. 7 One court, on the other hand,
has held that coverage is not triggered until the disease manifests itself, so
that only the present insurer is potentially liable. 8
In Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia integrated those ap-
proaches, holding that insurance coverage is triggered both by exposure
to asbestos and by development and manifestation of a related disease.
Each insurer covering any period during this process is liable for indemni-
fication of the manufacturer and for defense costs. 10 This liability is lim-
ited, however, to policy coverage, and many be reduced by the policy's
other-insurance clause. "1 The court also held that the manufacturer is not
proportionately liable for the periods during which it was uninsured. 12
Thus, the manufacturer's payments to plaintiffs will begin only after the
insurance funds run out. 13
Of the four decisions on insurer liability for asbestos-related injury, 14
Keene imposes the broadest liability. For the insurance industry, the im-
plications of Keene are enormous. Estimates of total payments for asbes-
tos-related injuries for 1977 to 1995 range from lows of $9.3 billion and
$25.6 billion' 5 to a high of $170 billion. 16 One insurance group says that
this potential liability is great enough to bankrupt both the manufacturers
and the insurers. 17
7. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
9. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 102S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
10. Id. at 1041-49. This is sometimes known as the "triple trigger" theory, because the insurer
may incur liability at any of three points along the way.
I1. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (summary of the "other-insurance" problems
when more than one policy covers an injury).
12. 667 F.2dat 1049.
13. In theory, insurance funds should be exhausted first. In actuality, manufacturers have ex-
pended millions of dollars to establish insurer liability. See. e.g.. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 30. 1982.
at 3. col. I (Manville Corp. claimed that it had spent $24.5 million in legal fees and $24 million in
asbestos-related claims thus far).
14. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). cert. denied. 102
S. Ct. 1644 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp.. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981): Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). aff'don rehearing. 657 F.2d 814. cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981) (corporate user rather than manufacturer of asbestos products: the court
saw no reason to treat insurance liability differently): Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co..
523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981), aff'dasinodified. 682 F.2d 12 (Ist Cir. 1982).
15. Vagley & Blanton. Aggregation of Clains: Liabilit vfor Certain Illnesses with Long Latency
Periods Before Manifestation. 16 FORUM 636,647 (1981).
16. Task Force, supra note 1, at 34-35.
17. Id. at 36. According to one estimate, the insurers spent approximately $1.35 billion for as-
bestos claims in 1981 as compared with "the total insurance industry's premium for all general liabil-
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Insurance Law and Asbestosis
This Note considers asbestosis, the principal injury caused by exposure
to asbestos, in the context of the conflicting theories of insurance recov-
ery. The Keene court's attempt to spread liability as broadly as possible in
a situation not adequately defined by the language of the insurance poli-
cies is the best judicial response yet articulated. Even this broad theory of
insurer liability, however, is insufficient in light of the magnitude and
extent of the occupational diseases involved. This Note proposes a na-
tional legislative solution to compensate workers who have been disabled
by exposure to asbestos and other modem industrial hazards.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Asbestosis
Asbestosis 18 is a lung disease that develops slowly, beginning shortly
after a worker first inhales asbestos fibers. 19 On the average, twenty years
pass before the condition is sufficiently advanced to manifest itself
through serious physical symptoms, disability, and death. 20
The disease was first reported in 190621 and was generally accepted as
a serious risk by the 1930's, at least for asbestos textile workers and min-
ers. 22 Although asbestosis was diagnosed in asbestos pipe insulation
workers23 as early as 1934,24 a postwar study of shipyard workers pro-
nounced asbestos insulation relatively safe.2 Hindsight shows that the
study period was too short, because of the long development period for
ity coverage (less medical malpractice insurance) in 1980 of just $6.3 billion." Id. at 37 n.49. See
infra notes 127 & 128.
18. Courts considering liability for asbestos-related disease have generally focused on asbestosis,
with only brief reference to mesothelioma and lung cancer. One court, when asked for clarification,
held that all three diseases should be treated the same. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 657 F.2d 814, 815 (6th Cir. 1981), aff'don rehearing, 633 F.2d 1212 (1980), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). Whether they should be treated similarly is beyond the scope of this
Note.
19. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (brief description of asbestosis).
20. Id. Not everyone who is exposed to asbestos develops asbestosis. See infra note 26.
21. Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 343 (1980); see also Mansfield,
supra note 1, at 864.
22. Mehaffy, supra note 21, at 343; see also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1973) (general discussion of problem), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
The danger of inhaling asbestos dust was certainly recognized by 1930. Mansfield, supra note 1, at
864-65.
23. Asbestos pipe insulation was in use as early as 1874. Mehaffy, supra note 21, at 342. It was
heavily used in World War II shipyards. See, e.g., Vagley & Blanton, supra note 15, at 637.
24. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1084 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
25. Id. at 1084 (citing Fleisher, Viles, Gade & Drinker, A Health Survey ofPipe-Covering Oper-
tions in Constructing Naval Vessels, 28 J. IDus. HYG. AND TOXIcOLOGY 9 (1946)).
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asbestosis. In 1965, the Selikoff report26 publicized the increased mani-
festation of asbestosis in past and present asbestos insulation workers.
Since then, the number of workers filing tort suits for asbestosis and re-
lated diseases has grown from one in 196827 to more the fifteen thousand
in mid-1982. 28
B. Theories of Insurance Recovery
The issue of insurer liability to manufacturers arose in the landmark
1973 decision of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,29 the first
case imposing liability on manufactuers of asbestos products for diseases
caused by those products. In Borel, the Fifth Circuit held that, if it is
impossible to apportion responsibility for a worker's asbestosis, the man-
ufacturers of all asbestos products to which the plaintiff was exposed are
jointly and severally liable. 30
Because of this decision, the extent of insurers' liability to manufactur-
ers has become a major issue. Many declaratory judgment actions have
been filed 31 to determine when a compensable "bodily injury" has oc-
curred. 32 These actions require the courts to construe the standard lan-
26. Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond. The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Industrial Insulation
Workers in the United States, 132 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SC. 139 (1965): see also Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. 493 F.2d 1076, 1085 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1973) (excerpt from Selikoff.
Churg, & Hammond study), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The authors of the study found
evidence of asbestosis in nearly half of the 1,522 insulation workers examined. The percentage of
abnormality ranged from 10.4% in workers with less than 10 years of exposure to 94.2% in those
with more than 40 years of exposure. Continued observation of Selikoff's study group has confirmed
that it takes two or more decades to find a sharp increase in death rate of exposed insulation workeis.
Selikoff, Hammond & Seidman, Mortalit." Experience of Insulation Workers in the United States and
Canada, 1943-1976. 330 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SC. 91, 114 (1979).
27. Mehaffy, supra note 21, at 345.
28. See supra note 1.
29. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Borel apparently was the
third asbestosis case filed and the first to be tried. Mehaffy, supra note 21, at 345.
30. 493 F.2d at 1096. In some jurisdictions industry-wide liability can be established without
proving exposure to the products of specific manufacturers. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215 n.3 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'don rehearing, 657 F.2d 814.
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
The Fifth Circuit recently stated that Borel did not hold that all asbestos products are dangerous as
a matter of law. Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1981). This decision
raises the possibility of repeated litigation of the degree of danger inherent in particular asbestos
products. See, e.g., Comment. An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALB.
L. REV. 1307 (1982).
31. Twenty-four such actions in various state and federal jurisdictions are listed in Ward, Cov-
erage for Exposure: Destructive Judicial Legislation, 24 FOR THE DEF., March 1982, at 10. 16 n. I.
In addition, DES and Agent Orange manufacturers have sued their insurers in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to have the Keene result applied in those industries.
Tamoff, Asbestos Firms Hope to Copy Keene Success, Bus. Ins., Apr. 12, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
32. The following policy language is typical:
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guage of the insurers' comprehensive general liability policies. 33 Two
main theories of construction have evolved: (1) "bodily injury" occurs
during exposure to asbestos, or (2) it occurs at the time an asbestos-re-
lated disease manifests itself.34
1. Exposure Theory
The exposure theory characterizes asbestosis as a continuing tort for
which all insurers providing coverage during the period between initial
exposure and manifestation are liable. 35 Advocates of this theory point to
[The insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of. . .bodily injury or. . .property damage to which this
policy applies caused by an occurrence.
"Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness, or disease sustained by any person which occurs
during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom.
"Occurrence" means an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions which results, dur-
ing the policy period, in bodily injury ....
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd
on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
Although insurers have denied that this language was intended to cover such longterm diseases as
asbestosis, at least one court has interpreted the "injurious exposure" language as indicating such an
intention. 633 F.2d at 1223. The court noted that published interpretations of the clause supported
such an inference, citing two analyses that concluded that exposure involving cumulative injuries
might be covered under more than one policy. Id. at 1223 n. 19.
Largely as a reaction to the asbestosis-coverage litigation, insurers are planning to rewrite the
standard comprehensive general liability policies so that, in the future, coverage will be provided
only for those injuries first discovered or those claims first made within a policy period. This change
would eliminate issues of when an injury "occurs." Densmore, Insurers Propose New Liability
Form to Limit Coverage, Bus. Ins., July 12, 1982, at 1, col. 3. See also Rosow & Liederman, An
Overview to the Interpretative Problems of "Occurrence" in Comprehensive General Liability In-
surance, 16 FORUM 1148 (1981) (discussion of when an "injury" .. occurs").
33. The Sixth Circuit, for example, noted in Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., that the various policies issued by the five insurers of Forty-Eight Insulations contained the same
definitions of coverage and terms. 633 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d
814, cert. denied, 102S. Ct. 686 (1981).
34. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1216-17 (6th Cir. 1980), (discussing the two theories), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). Forty-Eight Insulations and some insurers also argued that coverage
should extend from exposure through manifestation, the position ultimately adopted by the D.C.
Circuit in Keene, but this argument was not discussed by either of the Forty-Eight Insulations courts.
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1238 (E.D. Mich.
1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 686 (1981).
35. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1217 (6th Cir.
1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). The exposure theory
does not by itself make clear when a given cumulative disease begins or when it ends. Exposure could
include the period of "exposure in residence" that the Keene court included in its definition of injury.
The D.C. Circuit's theory of coverage makes this question less important than the Sixth and Fifth
Circuits' exposure theories. See Note, Insurance Law, Products Liability Insurance-Time of Expo-
sure Triggers Coverage for Asbestos-Related Diseases, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1127 (1980) (discussing
the district court opinion in Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp.
1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978)) [hereinafter cited as lnsurance Law].
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medical evidence that bodily injury occurs gradually, beginning when as-
bestos fibers are first inhaled. 36 Two circuits have adopted the exposure
theory.37
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 38
the first reported opinion to address the issue of insurer liability, 39 the
district court adopted a variation of the exposure theory. It imposed liabil-
ity for the years of the "injury-producing process," i.e., the years of ex-
posure to asbestos. 40 The court noted that the extent of the continuing
controversy over which theory to adopt was demonstrated by the fact that
the insurance industry had initially espoused the exposure theory, but
some insurers had switched to espousing the manifestation theory after
Borel.4 1
One commentator has recommended a disease-by-disease determination of when a cumulative dis-
ease begins. See Comment, Liability Insurance for Insidious Disease: Who Picks Up the Tab?. 48
FORDlAM L. REV. 657 (1980). Similarly, the dissent in Forty-Eight Insulations recommended that
the court arbitrarily choose a date 10 years before manifestation as the date asbestosis began. 633
F.2d at 1230-31 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
36. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212. 1217 (6th Cir.
1980), aff'don rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
37. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.). cert. denied sub nom. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'don rehearing, 657 F.2d 814. cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 686(1981).
It is not entirely accurate to say that "two circuits" have adopted this theory. All four of the
actions decided thus far were brought in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction. Construction of
the insurance contracts is a matter of state law under the Erie doctrine. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Apparently neither the parties to these actions nor the courts gave serious
consideration to the issue of which state's law might apply. The D.C. Circuit, for example, men-
tioned six states that might be chosen and said only that the "'basic principles governing the interpre-
tation of insurance policies are the same in each state." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d 1034, 1041 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982). In all, nine states
have been mentioned as sources of law in these actions, and all four courts stated similar rules of
contract interpretation. Thus, applicable rules of construction can be assumed to be similar in at least
these nine states, and the very lack of discusson suggests that similar principles would apply else-
where. One could speculate that these decisions could result in an assumption that there is a general
federal common law of contract. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that states use similar
principles of contract interpretation and that the courts are attempting to apply state law in these
cases.
38. 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). aff'd on
rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
39. One earlier un eported opinion adopted the manifestation theory. Porter v. American Optical
Corp., No. 75-2202 (E.D. La., Dec. 23, 1977), rev'd, 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). Similar issues of insurer
liability arise in DES claims, which involve an anti-miscarriage medication that causes cervical
cancer in some daughters born to mothers who had taken the drug during pregnancy. See, e.g..
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 95 Misc. 2d 222, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978) (the court stated that the policy periods were keyed to the resulting injury and found
liability for the insurer providing coverage when the daughter manifested cancer).
40. 451 F. Supp. at 1238-40.
41. Id. at 1238.
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the district
court had "reached the right result for the right reasons."42 It distin-
guished cumulative diseases such as asbestosis from ordinary accidents or
diseases on the basis that a cumulative injury occurs continuously even
though it takes years to manifest itself.43 The court construed the insur-
ance policy definitions of "bodily injury" and "occurrence" to include
asbestosis because of the logical construction of those terms44 and be-
cause of the parties' expectations. 45
The court of appeals also stated that each insurer during any part of a
plaintiff's exposure to the manufacturer's product 46 was obligated to de-
fend and possibly to indemnify the manufacturer. 47
The Fifth Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit and adopted the exposure
theory of liability in Porter v. American Optical Corp.4s The court of
appeals reversed the district court's adoption of the manifestation the-
42. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1226 (6th Cir.
1980), aft'don rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
43. Id. at 1219. The court noted that by 1976, Forty-Eight's insurer had inserted a $100,000-per-
person deductible clause for asbestosis, which left Forty-Eight essentially uninsured for asbestosis
under the manifestation theory. Id. at 1216 n.6 & 1222. The court also rejected as unworkable the
dissent's proposed alternative, which would limit liability arbitrarily to 10 years after first exposure,
or when the disease was theoretically first "discoverable." Id. at 1217-18.
44. 633 F.2d at 1222. The court characterized the terms as "inherently ambiguous as applied to
the progressive disease context," but concluded that
[t]he medical evidence is uncontroverted that "bodily injury" in the form of tissue damage takes
place at or shortly after the initial inhalation of asbestos fibers. Thus, it requires only a straight-
forward interpretation of the policy language for us to adopt the exposure theory. Indeed, for
insurance purposes, courts have long defined the term "bodily injury" to mean "any localized
abnormal condition of the living body."
Id.
45. Id. at 1223. The court also noted the standard rule that "insurance contracts are to be liber-
ally construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer." Id. at 1219 (quoting from the district
court opinion, 451 F. Supp. at 1237-38).
46. The court limited the manufacturer's and insurers' liability to periods in which the plaintiffs
were exposed to the manufacturer's products. But it placed the burden of disclaiming coverage on the
insurer. 633 F.2d at 1225.
47. Id. at 1224-26. The court further held that each insurer's obligation to indemnify and to
defend should be apportioned according to the length of coverage periods, and that a manufacturer
must share in the apportionment for any uninsured years. Id. at 1225. The court agreed with the
district court that, to avoid stacking of policy limits, no insurer should be liable in any one case for
more than its highest single yearly policy limit on a policy in effect at some time during the plaintiff's
exposure. Id. at 1226 n.28. The district court specified that if more than one insurer provided cover-
age during the exposure period, they would be jointly and severally obligated to assume the defense,
and if no exposure dates had been alleged, then the insurer at the time suit was filed must provide the
defense. 451 F. Supp. at 1245.
48. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter,
102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). The court assumed that, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, Louisiana
law would apply or the law of "a state where the law would be the same as that of Louisiana." Id. at
1145. In adopting the Sixth Circuit's interpretation, the Fifth Circuit assumed that the underlying
principles of contract construction were the same. See supra note 37.
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ory, 49 finding that the terms of the insurance policy mandated adoption of
the exposure theory and proration of coverage among insurers. 50
2. Manifestation Theory
Under the manifestation theory, bodily injury does not occur until as-
bestosis becomes apparent. This is the earlier of the date on which a
worker first knows or should have known of the disease, or the date on
which it is diagnosed. 51 Under this theory, the manufacturer's insurers on
that date pay any liability judgment. 52
The First Circuit has adopted the manifestation theory of coverage. In
Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ,53 the District
Court for Massachusetts adopted the date of actual diagnosis or the date
of death as the date of manifestation. 54 The court based its decision on
both the reasonable expectations of laypersons and the policy goals be-
hind the rules of construction for insurance contracts. 55 It found that the
manifestation theory is closest to the layperson's definition of injury as a
"clinically evident, diagnosable disease," whereas the exposure theory
depends on "sophisticated medical analyses." 56 The court also stated
that the case was unlike the situation in Forty-Eight Insulations because
49. In an unreported opinion the district court had rendered judgment against the manufacturer of
a respirator intended to filter out asbestos fibers and against the insurer at the time the plaintiff's
disease manifested itself. Porter v. American Optical Corp., No. 75-2202 (E.D. La.. Dec. 23, 1977).
rev'd, 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102
S. Ct. 686 (1981). The Fifth Circuit adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, affirming the judgment
against the respirator manufacturer and reversing the judgment against the manifestation-period in-
surer. The court stated that the controlling principles of insurance coverage should be the same as if
the suit had been against a manufacturer of asbestos products. 641 F.2d at 1144.
50. 641 F.2d at 1145. The court stated: "We accept the 'injurious exposure' theory and the
logically consequent rule of proration of liability for insurance carriers who were on the coverage
while the injured party was exposed to the asbestos hazards which resulted in illness and death." Id.
51. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (6th Cir.
1980). aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
52. Id. at 1216-17.
53. 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981), aff'das modified, 682 F.2d 12 (lst Cir. 1982).
54. 523 F. Supp. at 118. The court based its choice of date on certainty of coverage and ease of
administration. Id.
55. On appeal, the First Circuit extensively explained the rules of construing contracts in general
and insurance contracts in particular. The court stated that the dominant purpose was "to give effect
to the intentions of the parties.'" Eagle-Picher Ind. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir.
1982). If the language was clear, then the intent was ascertained by the plain meaning of the lan-
guage. If the language was ambiguous, then the court could consider extrinsic evidence of intent. " If
the meaning of the policy terms remains unclear, the policy is generally construed in favor of the
insured in order to promote the policy's objective of providing coverage." Id. at 17. The court ob-
served that here, the parties agreed that the language was clear, but disagreed on what it "clearly"
stated. Id. at 18.
56. 523 F. Supp. at 114.
Insurance Law and Asbestosis
the exposure theory would leave Eagle-Picher largely uninsured.57 Thus,
although the Eagle-Picher court interpreted similar insurance policy lan-
guage differently, its result followed the two other circuits in providing
maximum coverage of the manufacturer. 58 This result reflects a basic ob-
jective in construing insurance contracts: to provide coverage. 59
On appeal, Eagle-Picher, which had argued for the manifestation the-
ory below, argued for the result reached in Keene. The corporation also
argued that, in any case, the district court had chosen the wrong date of
manifestation. 60 The court of appeals said that the principal issue was
whether asbestosis "results" soon after exposure or after it manifests it-
self clinically. 61 The court of appeals agreed that, based on the medical
57. Id. at 118. Eagle-Picher was uninsured for most of the years in which it manufactured asbes-
tos products, but continued to buy liability insurance for asbestos injuries after it ceased production.
The court therefore found that the manifestation theory best fit with the expectations of the parties. Id.
In contrast, the manifestation theory would have left Forty-Eight Insulations uninsured. Id. at 117.
The Eagle-Picher court noted that the Forty-Eight Insulations decision appeared to rest on public
policy grounds, but to the extent it was based on the medical evidence, the court did not agree. Id. at
117 n.9.
58. Although Eagle-Picher manufactured asbestos products between 1931 and 1971, it had liabil-
ity insurance coverage only from 1968 through 1979. At the time of suit, Eagle-Picher had been
named a defendant in 5,500 suits alleging injury from contact with its asbestos products. 523 F.
Supp. at 111, 113. These facts made the manifestation theory the best method of increasing liability
coverage.
In contrast, the facts in Porter and Forty-Eight Insulations favored application of the exposure
theory. Porter worked at National Gypsum from 1950 to 1974. He worked in an area where American
Optical supplied respirators from 1960 to 1973. He was first hospitalized for shortness of breath in
1971, and asbestosis was diagnosed in 1975. Aetna covered American Optical during the early years
of Porter's exposure; Hartford covered several years of exposure, manifestation, and permanent disa-
bility; and Continental covered part of the disability period, diagnosis, and death. The Fifth Circuit
held that liability should be prorated between Aetna and Hartford, carriers during portions of the
exposure period. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1144-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
Forty-Eight Insulations manufactured asbestos products from 1923 to 1970. It had no records of
liability insurance before 1955. It was insured by Insurance Company of North America from 1955 to
1972, Affiliated FM from 1972 to 1975, Illinois National from 1975 to 1976, and Liberty Mutual
thereafter. Liberty Mutual's policies contained a $100,000-per-person deductible for asbestosis,
which would have meant minimal coverage under the manifestation theory. By the summer of 1979,
more than 1,300 claims had been filed against Forty-Eight Insulations. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215, 1216 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing,
657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
59. See supra note 55.
60. Eagle-Picher Ind. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1982). The district
court had chosen the date of actual diagnosis or death. 523 F. Supp. at 118. The court of appeals
concluded that "injury" during the policy period was not the same as "diagnosis" during the policy
period, and the policy was clearly intended to cover "injury." 682 F.2d at 24. See infra note 64.
61. 682 F.2d at 17. Because all parties had agreed that the language of the parties was unambigu-
ous, the district court had not admitted extrinsic evidence to show the parties' intent. It had relied
only on medical testimony "bearing on the nature of asbestosis." Id. at 18; see also supra note 55.
Secondarily, the court had to decide when an "occurrence" causing personal injury takes place under
one of the policies at issue. 682 F.2d at 17.
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evidence concerning when asbestos fibers actually cause injury, the ordi-
nary meaning of the policy language supported the manifestation
theory. 62
The court concluded that although "the medical testimony and the
plain meaning of the policy language strongly support the manifestation
approach, any remaining doubts about interpretation of the policies are
properly resolved in favor of the insured, in order to effectuate the poli-
cies' purpose of providing coverage.' '63 The court modified the district
court's choice of a manifestation date to the date on which "the asbestos-
related disease became reasonably capable of medical diagnosis.' 64
II. THE KEENE COURT'S REASONING
For twenty-four years, Keene Corporation and its predecessors manu-
factured thermal insulation products containing asbestos. 65 Today Keene
faces more than 6,000 suits that allege personal injury or wrongful death
from use of its products. 66 Keene has sought defense and indemnification
from its comprehensive general liability insurers. The insurers either de-
nied their responsibility to Keene or sought to limit it.67
Keene therefore filed a declaratory judgment action against its insur-
ers. 68 The district court adopted the exposure theory of coverage and held
62. Id. at 19. The court also decided that it was not error to refuse to admit extrinsic evidence to
show the parties' intent, because the proffered evidence did not show clearly an intent that insurance
coverage be provided on the basis of the exposure theory. Id. at 21-22.
63. id. at 23. Eagle-Picher had continued to buy liability insurance even after it stopped manu-
facturing asbestos products, an act the court considered inconsistent with reliance on the exposure
theory. Id.
64. Id. at 25. The court said the policies required that disease result during the policy period, not
that it be diagnosed during that period. Id. at 24. When a disease could have been diagnosed is an
issue for future litigation. See. e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp.. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.).
cert. denied sub nora. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981) (plaintiff
treated for a variety of complaints over several years: with the benefit of hindsight, these complaints
were probably clinically diagnosable asbestosis). The court also did not address the consequences of
potential diagnosis in one policy period and actual diagnosis in another.
65. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034. 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981). cert.
denied. 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1039. See infra note 68.
68. Keene sought a determination of the extent to which each policy covered its liability for
asbestos-related diseases. 667 F.2d at 1038. Keene manufactured asbestos products from 1948 until
1972. It was covered by general liability insurance from 1961 until 1980. In chronological order, the
policies were issued by Insurance Company of North America, Liberty Mutual. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. and Liberty Mutual. Id.
Keene and the insurers presented three different theories of coverage. Keene argued that any stage
in the progression of an asbestos-related disease, from exposure through manifestation, triggered full
coverage under each insurance policy. Three insurers (Aetna, Insurance Company of North America.
and Liberty Mutual) argued that only manifestation of bodily injury triggered coverage. The fourth
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that each company insuring Keene during part of the exposure period was
liable for a pro rata69 share of indemnification and defense costs. 70 It held
Keene liable on the same basis for the years in which Keene was unin-
sured. 71 The court, sua sponte, certified its order for interlocutory ap-
peal. 72
The court of appeals reversed. It held that all insurers during the expo-
sure and manifestation periods were liable to the extent of their policy
limits. 73 It held further that Keene did not share that liability. 74 In reach-
ing this result, the court had to resolve three issues: (1) what event trig-
gers policy coverage; (2) the extent of the coverage once it is triggered;
and (3) the allocation of liability among insurers if more than one policy
is triggered. 75
A. What Event Triggers Coverage
The court of appeals examined the language of the policies at issue to
determine whether they provided coverage in this situation. Each policy
provided that an "injury," rather than an "occurrence that causes in-
jury," triggered coverage. 76 To determine whether "injury" included cu-
insurer (Hartford) argued that inhalation of asbestos triggered coverage and therefore each company
that covered part of the exposure period was liable according to the ratio of exposure years during its
coverage to the total exposure period.
Keene and Hartford filed motions for partial summary judgment based on their theories. Aetna
filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that no case or controversy had been presented
because the coverage issue was not raised in conjunction with any of the underlying tort suits. The
district court denied Aetna's motion and granted Hartford's motion, relying largely on the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations. It granted Keene's motion in
part and denied it in part. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C.),
rev'd, 667 F.2d 1034 (1981).
69. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
70. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 F. Supp. 47, 51 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 667 F.2d
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
71. Id.
72. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
73. The court recognized that a cumulative injury necessarily fell within several policy periods.
Keene argued that it was entitled to indemnity up to the sum of the limits of all the policies triggered.
The court found, however, that Keene was entitled to only the extent of coverage it would have had
for a traditional injury and held that only one policy's limits could apply to any one injury. Id. at
1049.
74. Id. at 1047-49. In light of its holdings, the court reversed the district court's order and
remanded the case to trial on the issue of damages for failure to indemnify or defend Keene and on the
issue of the applicability of one of Keene's insurance policies. Id. at 1052.
75. Id. at 1042.
76. The court quoted typical coverage language from the Hartford policy:
[T]he company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury... to which this insurance applies, caused
by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
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mulative diseases such as asbestosis, the court used standard rules of con-
struction for insurance contracts. The court said that it would "give effect
to the policies' dominant purpose of indemnity" and that any ambiguity
in the insurance contract would be construed in favor of the insured. 77
The court stated that it would use "the reasonable expectations of Keene
when it purchased the policies" to discern the scope of the insurance pol-
icy. 78 Using these standards, the court adopted both the manifestation and
the exposure theories of insurer liability and interpreted "bodily injury"
to mean "any part of the single injurious process that asbestos-related
diseases entail. -79
The court also concluded that Keene could have reasonably expected
coverage of injuries caused by exposure to its products during the in-
surer's coverage period, even if the injury did not become known until
after the insurance policy's expiration. The court noted that otherwise in-
surers could avoid liability by terminating coverage after the magnitude
of the problem became obvious but before many cases of disease man-
ifested themselves. 80 The court placed on the insurers the burden of prov-
ing that the plaintiff was not exposed during the period covered by the
policy.
The court based its decision to accept the manifestation theory largely
on Keene's reasonable expectations. It concluded that Keene could have
reasonably expected coverage for asbestosis manifested during a particu-
lar insurer's coverage period because the policies state that the insured is
covered for all "injuries" occurring during the policy period. 8'
insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury ... even if any of the allegations of
the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent. ....
Id. at 1039 (emphasis added by court). See also supra note 3 (typical policy language concerning
"'bodily injury" and "'occurrence").
77. 667 F.2dat 1041.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1047. The court stated that the rights and obligations under the policies would be
undermined if either manifestation or exposure alone triggered coverage. Id.
80. Most insurance companies did, in fact, cease to cover asbestos-related diseases in 1976.
when the magnitude of the problem became evident. Id. at 1045. The court stated that if only mani-
festation triggered coverage, insurance companies would bear only a fraction of Keene's liability.
which "would undermine the function of the insurance policies." Id. at 1046. The court compared
the situation to one in which loss begins during a policy period but continues to develop after the
policy expires, as when an insurance policy expires while a house is being damaged by unstable
ground. Id. at 1046 (citing Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1962)) (insurer not permitted to terminate liability while the peril that materialized during
the policy period is still alive).
81. 667 F.2d at 1044. Because the policies gave no indication that the parties contemplated ex-
clusion of diseases that began to develop before the policy period, the court decided that a "latent
injury, unknown and unknowable to Keene at the time it purchased insurance." was covered under
the policies. Id.
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B. Extent of Coverage
During the twenty-four years that Keene manufactured asbestos prod-
ucts, it had four insurers. Keene had no insurance for thirteen of those
years. Because the court defined "injury" as a process, one asbestos-
related injury might trigger coverage of several different policies. 82 This
raised issues of the extent of each insurer's liability and of Keene's liabil-
ity for its uninsured periods.
The court rejected arguments that each insurer's liability should be lim-
ited to a pro rata share, because the insurance policies provided that the
insurer would pay "all sums" that Keene became legally obligated to pay
because of bodily injury during the policy period. 83 The court said that
this represented "the insurers' promises of certainty to Keene ' 84 and
reiterated that each policy gave Keene the right to be free of liability for
asbestos-related disease.8 5 The court noted that the policy language did
not provide for a reduction in liability if only part of an injury occurred
during a policy period. 86 Therefore, the court held that each insurer
whose policy was triggered was liable in full, to the extent of the policy
limit and subject to "other insurance" provisions. 87
The court rejected arguments that Keene should be proportionately li-
able for injuries that occurred partly during its uninsured periods. The
court said it would have had to "pretend" that Keene had a "self-insur-
ance policy" and would have had to improvise the limits and provisions
82. Id. at 1047. In addition to occurring in several policy periods, bodily injury might occur
partly during an uninsured period. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1048.
86. Id. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (summary of the "other-insurance" prob-
lems when more than one policy covers an injury).
87. 667 F.2d at 1047. The "other-insurance" provisions provide for apportionment when more
than one policy covers a loss. One such provision states: "When both this insurance and other insur-
ance apply to the loss on the same basis, whether primary, excessive or contingent, INA [Insurance
Company of North America] shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of the loss
than stated in the applicable contribution provision below." Id. at 1050. The contribution provision
provided for "contribution by equal shares" or "contribution by limits," depending on the language
of the other policies. Id.
The court recognized that certain factual issues would arise in determining apportionment. Al-
though the same set of facts would show both tort liability of the mpanufacturer and contractual liabil-
ity of the insurer in the ordinary product liability suit, this is not necessarily true if several manufac-
turers in an asbestos-disease suit are held jointly and severally liable. In the latter case a tort plaintiff
need not prove that a particular manufacturer caused all of the injury claimed. Id. at 1051.
Nevertheless, information concerning a particular manufacturer's liability would be necessary to
show the extent of an insurer's liability to the manufacturer. The court put the burden on the insurers
to show that keene's products could not have been involved for certain years. If this burden is met,
the insurer is relieved of liability for those years. This determination can be made separately from the
underlying tort suits. Id. at 1051-52.
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of this "policy." 88 Using the same reasoning, the court held that Keene
was not liable for a proportionate share of its defense costs. 89 The court
noted, however, that Keene would not be covered for an injury if it had
no insurance during any part of the exposure or manifestation period. 90
C. Allocation of Liability
The court next addressed allocation of the insurers' liability when sev-
eral insurance policies are triggered by one injury. The court allowed
Keene to collect the full amount due under any one policy from any in-
surer whose policy was triggered, subject to the other-insurance
clauses. 91 In addition, it allowed Keene to select the policy that would
provide coverage for a given injury. 92 The rationale was that the primary
duty of the insurers is to indemnify Keene, and that the selected insurance
company could use its other-insurance clause to reallocate liability among
the appropriate insurers. 93 The effect of the court's decision was to spread
the manufacturer's liability over the broadest possible base.
88. Id. at 1049. Judge Wald, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the decision to exempt the
manufacturer from a share of the liability for voluntary uninsured periods. In her view, "[i]f asbes-
tos-related diseases are understood as progressive or cumulative, then all those who voluntarily as-
sumed risk during the period when the disease progressed must share the responsibility for the judg-
ment and this includes self-insurers." Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring in part).
89. See infra note 93. As the court observed, if an insurer is fully liable for indemnification for a
given injury, it follows logically that the insurer also bears the full defense cost. 667 F.2d at 1050.
The complexities that can arise from a duty to defend were avoided by the court and are not discussed
in this Note. See generally R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 7.6 (1971) (general discus-
sion of the nature and scope of the liability insurer's duty to defend).
90. 667 F.2d at 1049. The court placed the burden of proof on the insurers to show that exposure
to asbestos in the manufacturer's products could not have occurred during or before the insurers'
policy periods; such a showing would relieve the insurers of liability. Id. at 1052. Although the
insured usually has the burden of proof in this situation, the court determined that the unique charac-
ter of asbestos-related disease required a different approach. Id. at 1052 n.42.
91. See supra note 87. The court's "one-policy" ruling prevents the manufacturer from stacking
the various policies to obtain higher coverage of one injury. See infra note 106.
92. 667 F. 2d at 1049. The court rejected Hartford's argument that under this analysis a manufac-
turer with only a few years of insurance coverage was as well off as one that had many years of
coverage. Because only one policy can be applied to a given injury, the manufacturer can collect on
only one of the several policies for which it might have paid. The court saw this as providing more
benefit to the insurers than to the insured. Id.
93. Id. at 1050. The court also found that the policy language stated a broader duty to defend
than to indemnify. Id. Because the court had held each insurer fully liable for indemnification, "'it
follows that each is fully liable for defense costs." Id. As with indemnification, allocation of defense
costs among insurers would be controlled by other-insurance clauses or the doctrine of contribution.
Id. at 1050 n.37. Defense costs would be bome initially by the insurer selected by Keene; if any
insurance contract dispute could not be resolved without undue inconvenience to the plaintiff in the
underlying tort suit, then the insurance dispute would be resolved separately. Id. at 1051-52.
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III. ANALYSIS
The validity of the Keene court's decision to adopt both the exposure
and the manifestation theories must be analyzed in light of 'recedent, the
parties' expectations, social policy, and potential consequences. This sec-
tion shows that Keene represents the best judicial response to the problem
of insurer liability. It also questions the adequacy of tort actions for com-
pensating the growing numbers of asbestosis victims and proposes a stat-
utory solution.
A. The Decision in Keene
The court of appeals' decision in Keene in effect embraces all three
prior decisions on asbestos-insurer liability.94 The prior decisions reached
different conclusions on the basis of the policy language and medical tes-
timony, but each adopted the theory that provided maximum coverage to
the manufacturer. 95 By holding that all insurers with policies covering
any period from exposure through manifestation must indemnify the man-
ufacturer, the D.C. Circuit adopted a theory that assures maximum cover-
age regardless of the individual manufacturer's pattern of insurance cov-
erage. 96
Similarly, the court's shifting of the burden of proof to the insurers to
show absence of exposure is a logical extension of prior decisions that
placed the burden of proof on two or more defendants to apportion dam-
ages between themselves. 97 The rationale is that multiple negligent actors
94. The adoption of the exposure-through-manifestation theory resembles the proration-by-years
theory which was proposed by Travelers Insurance Company in similar litigation in California state
courts. 2 Irs. LMGATION REP. (LMG. RESEARCH GROUP) 114 (May, 1981). Under that theory, each
insurer on risk from exposure through death, settlement, or filing suit, plus the manufacturer during
its uninsured periods, would prorate a claim according to their years of coverage. The manufacturer
would not share defense costs. It is estimated that 25% of all asbestosis cases filed in the country are
in the California courts. Because a number of actions by manufacturers against insurers have been
consolidated, whatever theory of coverage is adopted in California will affect a sizable percentage of
the nation's underlying tort suits. Id.
95. See supra notes 57 & 58.
96. By the time of its decision, the D.C. Circuit had available all the prior asbestos insurance
decisions, see supra note 14, as well as American Motorists Ins. Co. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 95
Misc. 2d 222, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), in which the court held that the insurer at the
time of a daughter's manifestation of cancer as a result of her mother's use of DES must provide
coverage. The insurers before the D.C. Circuit, as well as Keene, had participated in several of the
prior actions as parties or as amici curiae. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980) (listing the participants), aff'd on rehearing, 657
F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
97. E.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85
Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, vacated, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (extensive discussion of the Sum-
mers principle in both opinions), cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Sindell, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).
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should not be allowed to escape liability to an innocent plaintiff, and that
the defendants have better access to the needed evidence. The court's rul-
ing in Keene, however, does reduce the manufacturer's incentive to coop-
erate fully with its insurers in defending against the underlying lawsuits.
at least until it has exhausted its insurance coverage.
Keene's broad approach to insurer liability is superior to the other
courts' resolution of the coverage issue for several reasons. First, this all-
inclusive interpretation 98 will expedite future litigation, if Keene's analy-
sis becomes the norm. The decision might limit future litigation on insur-
ance coverage to questions of apportionment between insurers, without
involving the manufacturer or the underlying tort suits. 99
Second, the court's definition of asbestos-related injury as one long
process, rather than a series of discrete injuries that occur with each phys-
ical reaction to inhalation, is a more accurate characterization of the med-
ical testimony. "Once begun, [asbestosis] progresses without additional
inhalation of asbestos...."100 The court's conclusion that every stage
from initial exposure through manifestation is part of a single injury
should prove useful in other tort areas as well. 101
See also W. PROSSER, LAw oF TORTS § 41 at 243 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser points out that
shifting the burden of proof is a desirable solution when it is clear that all defendants are negligent.
but it may be a hardship on an innocent defendant when culpability is in doubt. Id. Such a situation
could arise from the court's decision that the insurer must show that exposure to asbestos within its
policy coverage could not have occurred: see also Review of Recent Tort Trends. 30 DEF. L.J. 7-10
(1981) (discussion of Sianwners as applied in Sindell). The propriety of shifting the burden of proof
has also been questioned. See Note, Insurance Law-Dutsy to Indemnifv an(d to Defend-Each In-
surer which Provides Coverage During Worker's Exposure to Asbestos is Proportionatelv and lndi-
vtduallv Liable to Defend and Indenmif" its Insured. 26 VILL. L. REV. 1080 (1980) (discussing Sixth
Circuit's shifting of the burden of proof in Insurance Co. ofN. Ain. v. Forty-Eight Insulations. Inc. ).
98. Although the D.C. Circuit did not discuss'the exposure or manifestation question in other
contexts, the question is not a new one nor is it unique to diseases such as asbestosis. See Oshinsky.
Comprehensive General LiabilitY Insurance: Trigger and Scope of Coverage an Long-Terin Exposure
Cases, 17 FORUM 1035 (1982). The question has arisen in the context of latent defects causing injury
to property. and several cases have allowed recovery on an exposure theory when the injury involves
cumulative damage (as in the case of dry rot). In the personal injury area. adoption of a manifestation
theory appears to have grown out of attempts to avoid the statute of limitations problems that
stemmed from the "exposure" (i.e., initial conduct) theory in medical malpractice actions. See In-
surance Law, supra note 35. at 1130-32.
The repeated litigation of the exposure or manifestation question in various contexts may be the
result of policy language that cannot be made precise enough to cover all possible injuries. Although
Keene's later policies included continuous exposure to injurious conditions as part of the definition of
"occurrence." the language failed to specify how it would affect the insurer's liability. The court
used this lack of specificity as part of its basis for allowing a reasonable expectation of coverage. See
667 F.2d at 1047 n.28 & app. A for comparative definitions.
99. See supra note 87.
100. 667 F.2d at 1038 n.3. Asbestosis is described in more detail in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp.. 493 F 2d 1076. 1083 (5th Cir. 1973). cert. denied. 419 U.S. 869 (1974): see also
supra note 2 (discussing asbestosis).
101 As noted in the concurring opinion in Keene. the "injurious process" delinition of injury
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Third, characterization of asbestosis as an "injurious process" simpli-
fies litigation by making one insurer liable for a tort plaintiffs total in-
jury.' 02 Because a single insurer is liable in full in a given tort suit, litiga-
tion will be more expedient and less expensive for the manufacturer and
plaintiff, if not for the insurer. This removes disputes over the extent of
insurance coverage from the concern of the tort plaintiff and manufacturer
and properly confines them to a separate issue to be negotiated among
insurers themselves.
Fourth, the court's conclusion that the manufacturer is not liable for its
uninsured period avoids having to create both "policy limits" and
"other-insurance" clauses for the manufacturers. Despite the dissent's
position in Keene, there do not appear to be any available guidelines for
defining either clause. 103 Without a policy limit, if Keene selected itself
as the "insurer" liable to a given plaintiff, its liability would be virtually
limitless.104 This result is consistent with the court's determination that
Keene reasonably expected insurance coverage for injuries that man-
sets a precedent "for other product-exposure injuries, as of yet unknown in origin." 667 F.2d at 1058
(Wald, J., concurring). For example, in November 1981 the Fifth Circuit remanded a case for a
determination of whether the exposure or manifestation theory should apply to chronic injury caused
by "Zep Plus" in light of its decision in Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). See National
Serv. Indus. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 661 F.2d 458,462-63 (5th Cir. 1981).
Saying that the process is all part of a single injury is not the same as saying that everyone who has
been exposed to asbestos deserves compensation. As observed by the Eagle-Picher court, 90% of
urban dwellers show some lung scarring from asbestos fibers, yet these persons will not necessarily
ever become disabled from it. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F.Supp. 110, 115
(D. Mass. 1981), aff'd as modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). Compensation still depends on a
discoverable injury that caused a measurable amount of harm. For those who became disabled, the
disease did indeed begin many years earlier.
Both the Keene and the Forty-Eight Insulations courts were unwilling to equate the definition of
"injury" for the purpose of when a statute of limitations begins to run with the definition of "injury"
for the purpose of deciding the extent of an insurer's duty to indemnify. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1220 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d
814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034,
1043-44 (D.C. Cit. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
102. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
103. The majority opinion does not set out the applicable policy limits of Keene's coverage over
the years. By way of comparison, Forty-Eight Insulations' coverage ranged from $100,000/person,
$300,000/aggregate up to $500,000/$500,000 and back down to $300,000/$300,000; it stood at
$1,000,000/$1,000,000 with a deductible of $100,000 at the time of suit. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212
(6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). For a discus-
sion on the effects of conflicting "other-insurance" clauses, see infra notes 112-16 and accompany-
ing text.
104. It is unlikely that Keene would select itself as the "insurer" with primary liability until the
limits of every insurance policy has been reached. In any case, Keene is more properly regarded as
uninsured than self-insured: there is no indication of an internal plan to manage potential liability loss
during the uninsured years. See R. KEErON, supra note 89, § 1.2(b)(6).
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ifested themselves during a policy period and for those that were caused
during a policy period but remained undiscovered until later. It is impor-
tant to note that this ruling does not absolve Keene from financial respon-
sibility, but merely delays it until the policy limits of all insurers are ex-
hausted. 105
In addition, the court's decision that only one policy applies to any one
injury avoids stacking and is consistent with an attempt to treat cumula-
tive diseases like ordinary accidental injuries. In the ordinary accident,
only one policy is triggered, with its sole policy limit applying. 106 Simi-
larly, in the ordinary accident, Keene would have a duty to notify only its
current insurer of the potential claim. 107 The court's theory of coverage
makes all insurers "current" in the cumulative disease situation and
makes Keene responsible for notifying any one of them that a policy has
been triggered. This is the simplest administrative solution for matching
policies with the tort claims against Keene. 108
The court was unwise, however, in relying on Keene's "reasonable
expectations" as a basis for its theory of insurer liability. 109 By introduc-
ing the reasonable expectations of the insured, I10 the court unnecessarily
added a potential source of conflict because the decision is supportable by
the medical testimony alone. "Reasonable expectations" is an elastic
105. Further, as of 1976, Liberty Mutual's coverage of Keene contained a "large" deductible
clause, plus administrative charges. 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 n.21. Liberty Mutual's coverage of Forty-
Eight Insulations contained a $100,000-per-person deductible clause: the Sixth Circuit observed that
since most cases had been settling for less than that amount, the deductible meant Forty-Eight Insula-
tions would be, for practical purposes, uninsured for asbestosis that occurred after 1976. Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212. 1216 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980). aff'd on
rehearing. 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied. 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981 ).
106. The stacking issue usually arises in the context of whether more than one concurrent policy.
or sections within a policy, should apply to an occurrence. See. e.g.. R. KEETON. supra note 89. §
5.5(c) (recovery from medical payments or liability section of automobile insurance policy) and §
3.11 (other-insurance clauses: proration when more than one policy applies). The court in Keene was
concerned with the application of successive policies, a situation apparently not contemplated by the
policy language. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. See generally R. KEETON. supra note 89. § 7.2 (discussing presentment of claims).
108. It is unclear whether the choose-one-policy approach becomes complicated when a manu-
facturer's excess insurers are also involved. These insurers provide additional layers of coverage that
are triggered only when lower layers are exhausted. On March 8, 1982, Keene filed suit against its
excess insurers, seeking the same result that the D.C. Circuit reached against its primary, or first-
layer, insurers. Bus. Ins., Apr. 12, 1982. at 26, col. 3.
109. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text: but see Comment. Insurer Liability in the
Asbestos Disease Contet-Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrite. 27 S.D.L. REV.
239 (1982) (approving use of the doctrine as a common basis for decision in the asbestos insurance
cases).
110. The doctrine of reasonable expectations began to emerge in the 1960's, partly as a result of
the courts' increasingly strained attempts to characterize insurance clauses as "ambiguous" and then
to construe these clauses against the insurer. See R. KEETON. supra note 89. § 6.3(a): Keeton. Rea-
sonable Expectations ii the Second Decade. 12 FORuM 275 (1976).
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term that can be adjusted to fit a desired result, and the attempt to prove or
disprove its applicability may lead to more litigation. It is also question-
able whether Keene reasonably expected the insurer of thirty years ago to
cover the injury for which Keene is sued today. Moreover, it is extremely
unlikely that Keene expected to be able to choose which of its former or
present insurance policies would cover a given injury. 111
The court also did not address the effect of conflicting other-insurance
clauses, which are handled differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 112
For example, policies may contain "pro rata," "excess," or "escape"
other-insurance clauses. 113 Not only do courts differ on which clause con-
trols when two policies conflict, they also differ on the consequences
when two policies contain duplicate other-insurance clauses. 114 Courts
are increasingly likely to prorate the two coverages, but there are at least
four methods of proration. 115 The court thus left open an area of consider-
111. This extension of the reasonable expectations principle has been called "mandated cover-
age," or "expectations" created by the courts because of "the desirability of providing coverage that
is currently unavailable." Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1163 (1981). Abraham distinguishes
between individual consumers and "institutional" insurance: "[A]lmost all the cases [that rely on the
expectations principle] involve ordinary consumers without a sophisticated understanding of insur-
ance." Id. at 1154.
The president of Commercial Union Insurance Companies, a major insurer of asbestos manufactur-
ers, has stated that where "institutional" insurance is concerned, "the buyer and seller. . . are
represented by sophisticated agents and attorneys and ... the policy provisions, in many instances,
are in fact negotiated line by line, clause by clause." See Ward, supra note 31, at 12. This statement
and its implication that there are no reasonable expectations apart from policy language appear exag-
gerated in light of the finding of every "asbestos-coverage" court that the applicable language of all
the "negotiated" policies was the same. Eagle-Picher Ind. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17
(1st Cir. 1982); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Porter, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981); Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd
on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
112. See R. KEETON, supra note 89, § 3.11(b). See also Comment, Toward a More Equitable
Method of Prorating Liability Insurance Policies, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 943 (1978) (advocating a
method based on the maximum loss that each potentially liable insurer would bear if it alone covered
the incident).
113. These terms are defined as follows:
A standard escape clause provides that the carrier will be not liable for the loss if there exists
other valid and collectible insurance. An excess clause provides that the policy will extend cov-
erage only after the policy limits of other valid and collectible insurance policies have been
exhausted. A pro rata clause provides that in case of double insurance, the loss shall be prorated
according to the sum of the total applicable coverage.
Comment, supra note 112, at 947 (footnote omitted).
114. Id.at947-48.
115. Id. at 950-51. These four methods can be briefly summarized as follows:
Under the long-established majority method, the loss is apportioned between the policies ac-
cording to the ratio of the coverage limits of each insurance policy. The premium ratio method,
in contrast, prorates the loss according to the ratio of the premiums charged for each policy.
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able controversy. 116 Its failure to come to grips with this issue and its
unfortunate reliance on Keene's reasonable expectations make additional
litigation inevitable. 117
B. Inadequacy of Private Tort Actions for Asbestos
The courts in Forty-Eight Insulations, Porter, Eagle-Picher, and
Keene have interpreted virtually identical policy language to mean that
the insurer on the risk at the time of a victim's exposure to asbestos is
liable, that the insurer at the time of manifestation is liable, or that all the
insurers from the time of first exposure through development and mani-
festation are liable. Other actions involving other manufacturers are pend-
ing in various jurisdictions. One explanation for the diversity is that the
courts apparently have sought to spread coverage as broadly as possible in
each case. Certainly that has been the effect of the decisions.
Only a handful of the underlying tort suits have gone to judgment." 8
Plaintiffs have won about half of them.' 19 Worker's compensation pro-
vides little or no relief for many victims of asbestosis, 120 and litigation
costs are extremely high for all parties. 121
Under the equal footing method, if the loss is within the coverage limits of the applicable poli-
cies, each insurer assumes an equal share of the loss. Finally, the Ruan method apportions the
loss according to the loss each insurer would have bome had there been no double insurance.
Id. at 951 (footnotes omitted).
116. See, e.g.. Comment. Is There a Solution to the Circular Riddle? The Effect of "Other
Insurance" Clauses on the Public, the Courts. and the Insurance Industr . 25 S.D.L. REV. 37
(1980) (reviewing the continuing confusion and proposing a model other-insurance clause).
117. Eight months after the decision, Keene and its insurers were in court again, fighting over
how to implement the decision. The insurers accused Keene of manipulating the decision. Insurance
Company of North America said the issues were so complex it was nearly impossible for a court to
write an opinion that covered everything. Still unanswered, for example, was the question of when
Keene must select a policy to cover a given injury and whether it could later change its mind. Posst-
bilities include selection when a claim is filed or when judgment is entered for a plaintiff. Tarnoff.
Keene, Insurers Still Fighting Over How Claims Will Be Paid, Bus. Ins., June 21. 1982. at 1. col. 3.
These unresolved questions help to give validity to Aetna's position in Keene that the declaratory
judgment action was inappropriate outside the context of a specilic claim for injury, with its attendant
specific facts. The court of appeals rejected this argument. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am..
667 F.2d 1034. 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644(1982).
118. As of December 1981, about 20,000 cases were pending, with about 300 new cases filed
every month. Approximately 60 had been tried. Granelli. Asbestos Litigation: Background and Up-
date, 3 INS. LITIGATION REP. (LITIG. RESEARCH GROUP) 50 (Dec. 1981). Hundreds of cases have been
settled, but not at a rate that reduces the overall caseload. See infra note 128.
119. Granelli. supra note 118, at 51. These were suits against Johns-Manville but should be
representative of the total because the corporation is a defendant in most suits. See supra, note I.
120. Studies have found that. although occupational diseases are usually covered under state
worker's compensation programs. a number of obstacles intervene to deny adequate compensation.
Chief among them is proving a work-related cause. In addition, the average total payment received is
likely to be lower than that for an accident: for example, approximately $9,700 for total disability
from an occupational disease compared with $23,000 for total disability from an accident, and ap-
Insurance Law and Asbestosis
These circumstances suggest that the solution to adequately compen-
sating victims of asbestos-related injury does not lie in the courts. Their
efforts to interpret and apply various insurance policies 122 have resulted in
uneven awards in tort Suits, 123 no compensation at all for some plain-
tiffs, 124 and varied interpretations of the same policy language in different
jurisdictions. 125 This lack of uniformity undermines stability and predic-
tability and causes unfair hardship for many plaintiffs.
Further, private funds available for compensation of plaintiffs are not
unlimited. As the Keene court recognized, "we can still expect thousands
of cases of [asbestos-related diseases] to manifest themselves throughout
the rest of the century." 126 If no alternative method of compensation is
devised, then presumably thousands of claimants will sue manufacturers
in the future. But because insurance coverage has been almost unavail-
able since 1976, the manufacturers have, in effect, a lump-sum amount of
protection equal to the extent of past insurance. When that has been ex-
hausted, compensation will depend on the solvency of the manufacturers.
If the manufacturers go bankrupt under the burden, 127 the plaintiffs have
proximately $3,500 benefit to the survivor of an occupational-disease victim compared with $57,000
to the survivor of an accident victim. About half the victims of occupational diseases are compen-
sated by social security and around 15% by welfare. U.S. Dept. of Labor, An Interim Report to
Congress on Occupational Diseases 61-74 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Interim Report]. See also
Edes, Compensation for Occupational Diseases, October 1980 LABOR L. J. 595. Given the long
development period of asbestosis and other occupational diseases, it is possible that at least part of the
difference is based on the greater age and therefore shorter life expectancy of both the disabled and
their survivors.
121. "The Defense Research Institute estimates the cost of pending [underlying] litigation may
exceed $400 million." Granelli, supra note 118, at 50. It is estimated that plaintiffs lose 33 to 40% of
any recovery to legal fees and costs, and that insurers pay 35 cents in defense costs for every dollar
paid a claimant. Defense costs may reach 95 cents per dollar paid for a claim that goes to trial and
judgment. Task Force supra note 1, at 29-30. See also supra note 13.
122. See supra note 35.
123. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. In addition to suits lost on the merits,
some plaintiffs are barred from reaching the merits of a claim. For instance, the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that a cause of action accrues at the time of exposure rather than at the date of discov-
ery and held that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. See Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 430 N.E.2d 1311, aff'd as amended, 55 N.Y.2d 802,
447 N.Y.S.2d 437, 432 N.E.2d 139 (1981), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom. Rosenberg
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2226 (1982). It has been suggested that manufacturers
who installed asbestos products in ships and other locations under government contract have a com-
plete defense to liability. Rivkin, The Government Contract Defense: A Proposal for the Expeditious
Resolution ofAsbestos Litigation, 17 FORUM 1225 (1982).
125. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
126. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
127. Manville Corp. (Johns-Manville Corp. until 1982), considered the leading producer of as-
bestos in the Western world, filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy code on
August 26, 1982. The move came shortly after a study projected the possibility of 52,000 claims
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nowhere else to turn. Even the resources of the insurance industry may be
inadequate to fund the potential liability. 128
C. Suggested Alternatives to Tort Litigation
Another solution, preferably federal legislation, is needed to provide a
reasonable level of compensation to all victims of asbestos-related dis-
ease. Alternative solutions include a revision of worker's compensation
acts, 129 a revision of the social security disability program, 30 or specific
totaling $2 billion in liability. Manville had, at that date. $1. I billion in net worth, but under account-
ing rules, once a liability is estimated, a reserve fund must be set up. The move also apparently was
an attempt to persuade the government to pass a compensation bill. Manville attributes the necessity
of filing under Chapter 11 to the bad faith of its insurers in refusing to pay the claims. The tort suits
were stayed indefinitely. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27. 1982, at 1. col. 6. The study projected a range
of potential liability. Using the higher figures. Manville's liability could approach S5 billion. Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 15, 1982, at 14. col. I.
Manville subsequently said it would stop payment on a $6.1 million settlement with 141 plaintiffs
that was reached three months before the corporation's Chapter I I filing and intimated that it would
stop paying on all settlements. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6. 1982. at 8. col. I.
At least one other manufacturer has made a Chapter I l filing. On July 29. 1982. UNR Industries.
which has not made asbestos since 1962 but had a number of tort suits pending against it. filed under
Chapter I1. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27, 1982. at 1, col. 6.
It is possible that this move could backfire. Within a few days of Manville's act. Sen. Robert Dole
(R. Kan.) called the move "dubious and unusual at best" and indicated that the judiciary subcommit-
tee that he heads should consider changing the bankruptcy code to ensure that other companies do not
file for Chapter II protection when faced with product-liability suits. Wall Street Journal. Aug. 30.
1982, at 3, col. 2.
128. In 1980. settlements or awards to plaintiffs averaged $76.000 in 395 cases. In 1981. 302
cases were disposed of at an average cost of $58,500. According to one set of figures, judgments
against Johns-Manville (now called Manville), one of the largest defendants, have ranged from
$16,000 to $1,857.600 in the 25 trials won by plaintiffs. The latter included a verdict of $750.000 for
punitive damages. Granelli. supra noted 118. at 51. Figures from different sources tend to vary and
should be taken more as an indication of the potential magnitude of the problem than as a specific
status report.
Commercial Union's position paper states that the asbestos litigation cost "threatens the financial
stability of many of the insurance companies that are presently defending and indemnifying the vari-
ous asbestos defendants," and has implications for "society as a whole." Task Force. supra note I at
34.
Another report (for which Commercial Union provided financial support) estimates the present
value of future asbestos disease claims at $38.2 billion. It says that 51 insurance companies were
involved in paying these claims in 1980 and that their combined net worth was $11.5 billion. The
combined book value net worth of all property and liability U.S. insurance companies was $52.2
billion. The combined book value of asbestos manufacturers was $25.6 billion, which, according to
the report, was probably an overstatement of actual market value. P. MacAvoy. The Economic Con-
sequences of Asbestos-Related Disease 76-78. Working Paper No. 27 of the Yale School of Organi-
zation and Management (January 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
129. See supra note 120.
130. About half the victims of occupational diseases are not eligible for social security benefits
because they are not fully insured, do not meet recency of employment requirements. have enough
earnings to exceed the program's limitations, or do not meet disability requirements because they are
deemed able to engage in less strenuous employment than their usual occupation. Those who are
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asbestos-related legislation similar to the Black Lung Benefits Act. 131
Three such bills have been introduced into Congress. 132
Although a legislative solution is regarded by some as a manufacturer's
bailout, 133 it best solves the problem of achieving adequate compensation
for victims of asbestosis and other occupational diseases. Of course, at
least partial funding of a compensation program should come from the
manufacturers whose products cause the diseases, and from the insurers
who are thereby relieved of defense costs and potential liability. The fed-
eral government 34 and the tobacco industry 35 might also be included as
responsible parties.
Of the several bills introduced into Congress, the one given the best
chance of success is designed along the lines of worker's compensation:
its funding is intended to come from a worker's most recent employer or
from the asbestos manufacturers in general. 136 As in worker's compensa-
eligible for social security disability payments receive a total of about 37% of lost wages, compared
with 12% under worker's compensation. See Interim Report, supra note 120, at 80-83.
131. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 16, 92 Stat. 105 (1978).
This legislation originated as part of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-173, § 2, 83 Stat. 742 (1969), the first federal legislation to provide benefits for a single
occupational disease. The program has had difficulties in funding and in establishing eligibility re-
quirements and the Act has been amended several times. The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of
1981 (H.R. 5159) was designed to return the program to solvency by increasing the share paid by
mine operators. See Interim Report, supra note 120, at 85-91. See also Meiser, The Black Lung
BenefitsAct, 17 FORUM 813 (1982).
132. Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982, H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (introduced by Rep. Miller); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1981, S. 1643,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Sen. Hart); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act,
H.R. 5224,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Rep. Fenwick).
133. E.g., Smith & Channon, The Rising Storm, 17 FORUM 139, 153 (1981).
134. Many workers were exposed to asbestos while installing insulation in ships in government
shipyards. See Winter, Lawscope: Asbestos Legal 'Tidal Wave' Is Closing In, 68 A.B.A.J. 397
(1982). The Department of Justice, however, denies that the government had any legal responsibility.
It says it will defend to the limit the 13,000 claims against the government. Seattle Times, Sept. 10,
1982, at 6, col. 1.
135. Nonsmoking asbestos workers are five times more likely than the nonsmoking general
population to die of lung cancer. Smoking asbestos workers are fifty times more likely to die of lung
cancer than nonsmoking non-asbestos workers. Similarly, risk of death from asbestosis is higher in
smokers than nonsmokers. See Hammond, Selikoff & Seidman, Asbestos Exposure, Cigarette Smok-
ing, and Death Rates, 330 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCi. 473-90 (1979). At least one asbestos
manufacturer may try to make tobacco companies codefendants in 900 pending tort suits. See Review
of Recent Tort Trends, 30 DEF. L.J. 10-11 (1981). Because of the problems of showing causation in
tobacco cases, this defense tactic would further complicate this type of litigation. See, e.g., Wegman,
Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 COREiLL L.Q. 678, 696-724 (1966) (discussion of
problems of proving causation). The Fenwick bill provides for funding by contributions from asbes-
tos manufacturers and cigarette manufacturers. Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act, H.R.
5224, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
136. Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982, H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). When representatives of Manville Corp. appeared before the House Labor Standards sub-
committee seeking legislation that would require government as well as industry to contribute to a
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tion, compensation under this program is the worker's exclusive remedy
against the employer. 37 However, because many of the present suits
were filed by workers who were not employees of the manufacturers, the
exclusive-remedy element of this bill should be changed to include the
manufacturers as well as employers in order to relieve concerns about the
quantity of litigation. 138 The bill, which presently covers workers ex-
posed to asbestos or to uranium, is the foundation of a program to com-
pensate victims of occupational diseases. 139
One of the problems in designing a suitable compensation program has
been distinguishing occupational diseases from diseases that are not
work-related. 140 This problem shows one of the weaknesses of this coun-
try's disability compensation programs. A disabled person needs ade-
quate compensation that is not contingent on the source of disability. The
United States covers fewer occupational diseases under worker's com-
pensation than many other industrialized countries. 141 One reason for this
difference is that in Europe worker's compensation programs are gener-
ally integrated with national social insurance programs 42 that presumably
place less emphasis on the origin of the disease. In addition, European
fund to pay victims, committee Chairman Miller told them. "'You've got a snowball's chance in hell
of that happening." Seattle Times, Sept. 10. 1982, at 6. col. I.
137. It also provides the exclusive remedy against the employer's insurer or the worker's union.
The Fenwick bill requires cancellation of pending suits against manufacturers in order to receive
benefits under the Act. Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act. H.R. 5224. 97th Cong.. I st
Sess. (1981).
138. A high percentage of workers exposed to asbestos are not employed directly by manufactur-
ers. Asbestos has been used in various types of insulation, and as a component of cement waterpipes.
paints, acoustical tiles, flooring, brake linings, clutch facings, gaskets, draperies, ironing board cov-
ers, hotpads, stove linings, and innumerable other industrial and domestic products. Families of per-
sons who work with asbestos also show a higher rate of asbestos-related disease than the general
population. See I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE. (1978) (extensive discussion of the
history of use of asbestos, its nature, and its effects). After those engaged in primary asbestos manu-
facturing and insulation work, workers at greatest risk are those employed in making secondary as-
bestos products or in shipbuilding and repair (other than insulation). See. e.g.. P. MacAvoy. The
Economic Consequences of Asbestos-Related Disease 12, Working Paper No. 27 of the Yale School
of Organization and Management (January 1982) (table of relative risk of asbestos-related cancer
from employment in selected industries).
139. See Interim Report, supra note 120, at 12-38 (discussion of other occupationally related
pulmonary and respiratory diseases: byssinosis (from cotton dust). silicosis. chronic beryllium dis-
ease. and the effects of cadmium. chromium, arsenic, nickel, coal tar products. and diisocyanates).
140. See Note. Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REv. 916 (1980)
(concluding that any new compensation scheme will be inherently flawed because of the complexities
of identifying compensable diseases).
141. Interin Report, supra note 120. at 72. The United States compensated a greater number of
people, but when the figures were adjusted to reflect the greater size of the U.S. work force, the
results were: Sweden 340.000 Ontario. Canada 140,000: Belgium 140.000: Switzerland 125.000.
Great Britain 50.000: France 40,000; United States 30.000.
142. Id.
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countries have longer recognized and compensated for occupational dis-
eases. 143
The asbestos-insurance litigation makes clear that this country's system
of supporting those unable to work is increasingly inadequate to cope
with occupational diseases. Short-term legislation concerned only with
asbestos-related illness is inadequate. Comprehensive federal legislation
is necessary to adequately and fairly compensate victims of a wide range
of occupational diseases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current controversy over asbestos-insurance coverage has spawned
an enormous amount of litigation with vast social and economic conse-
quences. The Keene court's adoption of both the exposure and the mani-
festation interpretations of injury guarantees maximum insurance for
manufacturers to the extent of their insurance policies. This is the logical
extension of the prior holdings in this field and provides the most sensible
short-term approach to the problem.
The decision nevertheless provides only a temporary solution to a com-
plex problem' 44 and still leaves many questions unanswered. Legislation
is needed to provide benefits for victims of the increasing number of long-
term, occupational diseases for which traditional liability insurance and
courtroom solutions are inadequate.
Rebecca Cochran Earnest
143. Id.
144. The holding is, of course, a solution only for the Keene Corporation and its primary insur-
ers. The United States Supreme Court has declined to review the conflicting decisions in Keene,
Forty-Eight, and Porter. Since the First Circuit upheld the decision of the district court in Eagle-
Picher, yet another court is in conflict. The First Circuit decision will also be appealed. Bus. Ins.,
Oct. 18, 1982, at 2, col. 4. An attorney for petitioning insurers said that Eagle-Picher had increased
the confusion, as well as the conflict among circuits, and that many people wanted the issue of the
proper theory of coverage resolved. Id. It is possible, of course, that the Court will not be disturbed
that different results have been reached under the laws of the various states. See supra note 37.
